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Rational Financial Meltdowns
Manuel A. Utset*
I. INTRODUCTION
Markets are complex institutions created and maintained by
myriad actors, working in the shadow of legal rules and private
agreements. Why create markets? For one thing, they help
aggregate information about the preferences of market participants
and their expectations or beliefs about the asset's current and future
value, and to present the end result in intuitive, simple to understand
manner: a market price.' Brokers and dealers help keep markets in
good working order by acting as intermediaries between buyers and
sellers, extending them credit, and, in the case of market-makers,
stepping in to make sure that they always have someone to trade
with.2 Intermediaries also assist in transferring funds and delivering
the purchased assets.' The assets traded in financial markets include
vanilla securities (such equity and debt issued by firms), commodities,
and derivatives-securities that derive their value from that of other
assets, such as mortgages, credit card receivables, and even other
derivative securities.
* William & Catherine VanDercreek Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 86 (1948) (arguing that the price system allows individuals to make the
right decisions by merely acting on the price, through which "only the most essential
information is passed on and passed on only to those concerned").
2. See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION: BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING, 166 (2001)
(describing stock market crashes as significant drops in the value of traded securities that occur
notwithstanding fact that there are no significant news showing that there is an overall change in
the fundamental value of those securities).
3. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 803(7)(A)-(B), 12
U.S.C. § 5462(7) (2010) (defining "payment, clearing, or settlement activity" as "an activity
carried out by 1 or more financial institutions to facilitate the completion of financial
transactions"). See also Xavier Frcixas & Bruno Parigi, Contagion and Efficiency in Gross and
Net Interbank Payment Systems, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY:
READINGS AND PERSPECTIVES IN MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 297, 299-02 (Sudipto
Bhattacharya et al. eds., 2004) (describing interbank payment systems and the role of financial
institutions in assuring that they operate without interruptions).
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Financial markets are, as a general matter, reliable, robust4
institutions: they can absorb unexpected shocks and continue working
with little or no downtime. Sometimes, however, they simply break
down,' and stop working altogether or hobble along at a reduced
capacity for relatively long periods of time or they require the quick
and costly intervention of governments to bring them back into some
sort of working order. I will refer to this sort of institutional failure,
as a market "meltdown." In 2007 and 2008, the United States and the
rest of the world experiences a series of meltdowns in the markets for
real estate, real estate mortgages, real-estate-mortgage-backed
securities, other types of asset-backed securities, credit default swaps,
repos, money markets, commercial paper, commercial loans, and a
number of other markets. Some of these meltdowns were dealt with
in short-order, but the markets themselves failed to recover fully for
much longer periods.
What is striking, however, is not just that so many markets broke
down over a relatively short period of time-after all, many of these
discrete markets were interconnected with each other through meta-
markets that traded composite securities made up of assets drawn
from different markets. What is striking is the mere existence of so
many markets and meta-markets. The proliferation of markets was
part of well-intentioned and in some instances opportunistic attempts
to help parties deal with risk, in a well-ordered fashion: by identifying
a set of uncertain6 future states of the world, encapsulating each state
into a security, and creating a market to trade them. In an ideal world
financial engineers would create a security to handle each possible
future state of the world, and market designers would create market
for all of these securities, and this complete market would allow
parties to manage the future in an orderly fashion.' In a less than
4. See Carlo Ghezzi et al., Software Qualities and Principles, in THE COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 2278, 2281-82 (Allen B. Tucker, ed., 1997) (a system is robust
if it behaves reasonably well even when it encounters unforeseen contingencies; it is reliable if it
performs in the manner intended).
5. see MAUREEN O'HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 14-16 (1995)
(describing ways in which financial institutions help create markets, including helping facilitate
transactions and assuring that there is sufficient liquidity for those wishing to trade).
6. The most common way to model uncertainty is to posit that at any one point in time, the
environment is in a particular state, reflecting a set of properties true to the environment at that
time. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 33-34 (1974) (stating that a
decision-maker will "consider the world to be in one or another of a range of states," where a
state of the world is "a description which is complete for all relevant purposes").
7. A "state-contingent security" helps parties make decisions that take into account both
uncertainty and time. In a complete market, in which there exists one state-contingent security for
each possible future state of the world, parties are able to hedge for all possible risks. See Kenneth
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ideal world, one is left with a large number of markets, complex
securities, complex financial institutions creating and these markets
and designing and marketing these securities,' and these same
institutions, as well as institutional investors and business firms
believing that they have hedged (and/or gambled) wisely, in the
shadow of "almost-complete markets."
There is much about the story that is sensible and rational. 0
Hubris and self-dealing obviously played a part, as did systematic
mispredictions of risks, preferences, and the efficiency of markets.
This article focuses on the following question: how can a group of
rational, and often very sophisticated, financial actors cause financial
meltdowns, in the regular course of business? There is no doubt
much we still need to learn about irrational financial meltdowns, but
more likely than not, cognitive shortcomings only make matters
worse: they exacerbate the type of behavior that can lead even super-
rational actors to cause financial meltdowns.
Part II describes a set of problems created by certain
dysfunctional group dynamics and informational asymmetries, the
role played by financial intermediaries in helping reduce these
problems, and a number of risks associated with relying on
intermediaries.
J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD.
91, 92-94 (1964) (originally published in French, in 1953). The economist Gerard Debreu also
played a critical part in developing the state-contingent claim theory, and extending it. See
GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
98-102 (1959). See also ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 709 (1995)
(describing an incomplete market as one in which there are fewer tradable assets than there are
states of the world); Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75, 76 (1976)
8. See Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 OJ. ECON. 75, 76 (1976) (discussing
possibility of using derivative products to make contingent-state markets more complete).
9. See Robert C. Merton, Financial Intermediation in the Continuous Time Model, in
CONTINUOUS TIME FINANCE 370 (1992) (setting forth a sustained defense of financial
engineering, notwithstanding the fact that the "products" that they produce mimic "high-speed
passenger trains": socially beneficial but open to a few derailings before all of the kinks are
worked out).
10. 1 will adopt the standard economic assumption that a rational actor will be guided by an
underlying preference to maximize its utility, which, without loss of generality, we can assume
involves maximizing its net monetary returns. One can easily incorporate other factors that may
affect the decision-making process of corporate actors. See, e.g., Manuel Utset Reciprocal
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Finance Firms,
2002 WISC. L. REV. 45 (2002) (developing reciprocal fairness model within context of start-up
firms, in which actors are concerned both with monetary returns and fairness).
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II. INFORMATION, MARKET FAILURES, AND
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
This Part begins by describing group pathologies that can reduce
the joint welfare of group members, as well as the extent to which
informational asymmetries between transacting parties can affect the
proper working of markets. It then describes the role played by
financial intermediaries and financial markets in helping reduce the
social costs associated with group pathologies and informational
asymmetries. The next section, however, identifies a potential
problem of relying on financial intermediaries: parties transacting
with intermediaries face the same type of informational problems-
they do not know certain material things about the type of
intermediary that they are dealing with and about the actions taken
by the intermediary on their behalf. The last section examines the
symmetrical nature of the informational asymmetry problems faced
by intermediaries and the parties with whom they transact.
A. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES AND MARKET FAILURES
Neoclassical economics focused on the behavior of actors
interacting in perfectly competitive markets." Actors in these models
are perfectly rational automatons, who react to price signals and
choose the course of action which maximizes their utility.12 Beginning
with Coase's, The Nature of the Firm,13 and continuing with the rise of
modern microeconomic analysis, the emphasis turned to micro-
behavior: the actions of actors within firms and individuals within
households received greater attention.14  In particular, economists
11. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON.
1 (1957) (discussing general assumptions of neoclassical model).
12. Neoclassical economics, in short was concerned with studying markets, and to do so, it
was helpful to assume that the actors, including households and firms, had fully specified and
stable profit making and utility functions and always acted in the manner best suited for
maximizing profits and utility, respectively. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICRO-
ECONOMIC THEORY 5 (1990) (describing traditional economic models of consumer choice in
impersonal markets in which price is given and consumer choose action to maximize utility
given its budget constraints); JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 64 (3rd ed. 1980) (describing
neoclassical firm as a "black box" through which inputs are transformed into outputs, subject to
technological constraints).
13. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
14. Id. at 388, n. 2 (describing production through a firm as coordinated by an entrepreneur
(or manager) who directs production by fiat: an "entrepreneur" in a competitive market system
is a person who "take[s] the place of the price mechanism in the direction of resources").
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gave greater attention to potential conflicts among these individuals
and how these could undermine the broader goals of maximizing a
firm's profits or a household's aggregate utility."
One refinement of the neoclassical model draws a distinction
between the aggregate welfare of a group of individuals-firms,
households, as well as other types of groups-and the individual
welfare of its members.16  A group may fail to maximize its total
welfare under a variety of contexts. Collective action problems,"
such as the tragedy of the commons and free rider problems," and
various similar dynamics, such as the prisoner's dilemma,2 0 can lead
group member to choose self-serving courses of action that will make
them worse off than if they had all precommitted to do what was best
for the group.21 In some cases, group members have the same
individual goals but fail to coordinate their behavior because they
each commit to a course of action before they know what others have
done.22 As a result, they may end up acting in a manner that fails to
maximize the group's aggregate welfare. Both collective action and
coordination problems are due to informational problems: At the
time that each actor acts, they are unaware of how others have acted
(they move simultaneously).2
15. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (setting forth
agency theory of the firm that accounts for conflicts between entrepreneur/manager and outside
shareholders, and between shareholders and creditors).
16. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) (setting
forth general problem of associated with translating individual preferences into group
preferences); Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53
(1977).
17. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (setting forth
general theory of collective action problems in which the size of the group and the costs of
communication play an important role).
18. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing
the general problem).
19. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49 (1982).
20. See TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION 4 (1992) (describing the prisoner's dilemma
as a paradigmatic example of collective failure).
21. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 43-45 (1990) (describing problem of credible precommitment as way
of dealing with collective action problems); Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the
Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions, 14 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 182, 188 (1970)
(describing precommitment enforced by third parties as a way of getting around prisoner's
dilemma problem).
22. See infra Part IV.E. (setting forth the general problem of coordination failures in the
context of runs on repos).
23. See DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY, 9-10, 18-20 (1991)
(describing prisoner's dilemma and coordination games as simultaneous move games, in which
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A second refinement to the neoclassical model focused more
directly on informational asymmetry problems between actors, and
the effect of these asymmetries on behavior of self-interested actors.24
One type of informational asymmetry problem involves a party's
incomplete information regarding certain material characteristics of
another party or a product that they are selling.25 For example, a
shareholder who hires a manager to run its firm will have incomplete
information about the manager: Is she hardworking and honest?
Does she have the requisite general skills to manage a company and
the specific skills needed to run this company in particular?
Another way of stating the general problem is that a shareholder
is choosing from a pool of managers, where the pool members differ
along a number of parameters: they have different "types." 26 A
shareholder that is unsure about the type of the manager that it is
hiring may do a number of things to protect itself: discount for the
risk that the manager is of an inferior type (by offering it a lower
salary that the one it would pay a manager of the superior type),27 it
may acquire information to distinguish between the various types of
managers (including hiring a third party to certify), 28 or it may protect
itself contractually, such as by giving the manager a short-term
employment contract or requiring it to post a bond (take part of its
compensation on a contingent basis based on whether the manager
turns out to be of the superior type).29 At the same time, managers of
a superior type will try to find a way to credibly communicate this fact
to the shareholder. In this context, a credible statement is one that is
self-verifying: it is one that superior type managers are able to make
players act before knowing what other players have done).
24. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
MANAGEMENT 29-30 (1992) (describing general problem of informational asymmetry within
economic contexts).
25. See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 0. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (setting forth standard treatment of adverse selection
problem in context of used car dealers, which have informational advantage over potential
purchases of "lemons").
26. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 241-42 (2006) (describing
asymmetric information model in which one party is unsure about the characteristics or "type"
of the other party).
27. See id. at 242-43 (describing discounting for risk and its effects, such as leading good
types to cross-subsidize bad types, and in certain instance to the failure of parties to reach an
otherwise beneficial agreement).
28. See id. at 246 (describing use of certification by underwriters to deal with adverse
selection problems faced by a company issuing new securities).
29. See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567
(1988) (describing use of contractual safeguards and bonds to deal with informational
asymmetry problems).
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but inferior one find it too costly to mimic.30
In the second type of informational asymmetry problem, a party
cannot fully observe the actions of a second party." Suppose that the
shareholder has hired a manager to run the firm. The manager will
undertake a series of managerial actions that will affect the
shareholder's welfare. The manager will set certain business goals,
acquire information about the various ways of achieving those goals,
choose the best course of action, and executed at the time best suited
for maximizing the firm's profit. The shareholder is unable to
observe many of the manager's deliberation process and the set of
actions that it undertakes to achieve chosen business goals. This
includes the shareholder's general inability to observe how much
effort the manager exerts in identifying business goals, the best way of
achieving them, and carrying out the chosen course of action.3 2 In
order to protect itself, against this agency (or moral hazard) problem,
it can tie part of the manager's compensation to one or more metrics
that is observable by the parties, after the fact-such as earnings and
other accounting measures and changes in the value of the company.3
For example, the shareholder may give the manager a compensation
package that includes bonuses, restricted stock, and/or stock options.3 4
A shareholder may also protect itself by reducing the manager's
overall pay to hedge against potential losses from agency problems.
A manager may thus expend resources to alleviate the informational
risks faced by the shareholder, such as hiring independent third
parties to certify that the manager is acting in an appropriate
manner.35 Independent public accountants, underwriters, and rating
30. See TIROLE supra note 26, at 249-64 (setting forth various ways in which parties in
financial transactions engage in signaling aimed at dealing with the adverse selection problem);
Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 111-12 (1996)
(describing self-committing signals).
31. See KREPS supra note 12, at 577-79 (describing general characteristics of the "moral
hazard" or "hidden action" problem). Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 O.J. ECON.
75, 76 (1976) (discussing possibility of using derivative products to make contingent-state
markets more complete).
32. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 179-85 (setting forth various contexts in
which moral hazard problems arise within organizations and in financial markets).
33. See id. at 185-89 (describing various ways to deal with moral hazard problem, including
monitoring, bonding, and incentive mechanisms).
34. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Executive Compensation and Incentives, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 498, 500-05 (B. Espen Eckbo ed. 2007) (discussing use of restricted stock
and stock options to compensate managers, as well as various other components of standard
compensation packages).
35. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 15, at 308 (agents will sometimes incur bonding cost
in order to reduce agency costs).
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agencies often act as third-party certifiers; independent board
members can also act as certifiers, although given their ongoing
relationship with managers, their independence is more easily
compromised.
In conclusion, the neoclassical model's assumption that markets
are perfectly competitive, that market participants choose how to act
based on price signals and on their underlying objective to maximize
their utility is a useful one if one is modeling perfectly competitive
markets and is trying to understand the behavior of firms and
consumers. However, markets may fail to act in a fully competitive
manner due to informational problems: market failure may occur
due to the cost or impossibility to transfer and verify information
within groups or inability to accurately aggregate the preferences of
individual group members to come up with a way of determining
whether group members are maximizing their aggregate welfare. A
second type of market failure is due to a combination of
informational asymmetries and strategic behavior. In order to
address market failures it is necessary to deal with the informational
problems within groups and between transacting parties. One can do
so, by reducing the costs of acquiring the information or providing
actors with a way to hedge for the potential bad results flowing from
their informational deficits. Financial intermediaries and financial
markets help with both.
B. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, investment banks, hedge
funds, equity and venture capital funds, are matchmakers: They
identify and bring together potential investors and firms in need of
funds, and help reduce information-based transaction costs.3 6
Without intermediaries some transactions may never get done, and
others will be more expensive to consummate. In return for their
services, intermediaries will take a cut of the surplus produced by
their services. Intermediaries help deal with adverse selection
problems: they screen investments and certify the quality of firms.
36. See Martin F. Hellwig, Financial Intermediation and Risk Aversion, 67 REV. ECON.
STUDIEs 719, 719-720 (2000) (modeling intermediation as a relation between intermediaries,
the investors providing the funds and the firms making use of these intermediated funds, and
complaining that many studies fail to approach the two sets of financial contracts in a holistic
fashion).
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They also play a role in reducing moral hazard risks," as well as
assisting dispersed investors, such as depositors and shareholders,
deal with collective action problems and potential coordination
failures.38
Financial markets help reduce information asymmetry problems
by aggregating the information and knowledge of dispersed actors
into a single statistic: the market prices. Well-established firms
issuing well-understood securities such as common stock and standard
debt securities, can often bypass intermediaries and raise funds
directly from investors.39 All other things being equal, parties will
tend to choose intermediaries over markets when the firms seeking
funds do not have a proven track record or are engaged in businesses
that are complex or difficult for nonexpert third parties to value-
e.g., innovation intensive firms.4 0
37. Intermediaries deploy their expertise and use and economies of scale to reduce
informational asymmetry problems and avoid duplicative monitoring by investors. Ram T. S.
Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial
Intermediation, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 415-32 (1984) (making an economies of scale argument in
the context of delegated monitoring to intermediaries).
38. See Sudipto Bhattacharya ct al., Monitoring by and of Banks: A Discussion, in CREDIT,
INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY 122, 122 (Sudipto Bhattacharya et al. eds. 2004)
(stating that informational intermediaries are able to avoid free rider and reduce coordination
problems that beset decentralized investors in capital markets).
39. See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation, 24 FIN.
MANAG. 23, 26 (1995) (arguing that financial markets are efficient alternatives to financial
intermediaries, only to extent that securities are standardized, widely distributed and are "well-
enough 'understood' for transactors to be comfortable in assessing their prices").
40. For example, start-up companies go through various phases that further illustrate the
relative role played by intermediaries and markets. During the early phases of the business,
entrepreneurs often borrow directly from family members or friends. However, they also resort
to financial intermediaries by using credit cards or borrowing from banks and giving a personal
guarantee. As the start-up becomes more established they may get financing from venture
capitalists. Venture capitalists sell partnership interests to institutional investors and wealthy
individuals in start-up companies. As such, they are an example of a financial intermediary. As
a result they act as financial intermediaries between the investors and the companies in which
they make equity investments. As with banks, they provide value to their investors thorough
their expertise in screening, valuing, and monitoring investments. Even after venture capitalists
become involved, entrepreneurs will sometimes acquire funds directly from wealthy
individuals-i.e., angel investors. Finally, at the time of an initial public offering, underwriters
act as informational intermediaries between the company insiders and potential purchasers of
the stock. At the time of making an investment in a start-up company, a venture capitalist will
have incomplete information about (1) the innovation, and (2) whether she is a hard worker
with the required skills to run the venture. See Raphael Amit, Lawrence Glosten, & Eitan
Muller, Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, 36 MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE 1232 (1990) (setting forth an adverse selection model in the context of venture capital
financing); PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 3 (1999)
(discussing informational risks associated with venture capital investments).
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C. The Second-Order Risks Created by Financial Intermediaries
Financial institutions acting as intermediaries are subject to same
sort of group dynamics, adverse selection, and moral hazard problems
faced by non-financial, business firms. However, financial institutions
are more likely to experience sudden failures due to insolvency and
liquidity problems.41 An insolvent firm has liabilities that exceed its
assets,42 and will fail or be forced into reorganization proceedings if its
creditors require immediate payment of the amount owed.43  A firm
facing a liquidity problem has sufficient assets to pay its liabilities but
is unable to raise capital from third parties or transform its assets into
cash quickly enough to meet its obligations."
A liquidity problem can lead to insolvency, as the firm begins to
default on its loans. Defaults will in turn exacerbate the liquidity
problem since potential lenders may refuse to extend credit, or if they
do so, they will require a greater amount of collateral and charge
higher interest rates. This sort of liquidity-insolvency spiral45 can
cause a financial institution to fail, not due to unexpected declines in
the value of its assets, but from having its cash reserves and access to
working capital disappear.46 Financial institutions are particularly
susceptible to this sort of spiral, given that they finance their
operations using relatively short-term debt and make extensive use of
41. A firm facing an insolvency or liquidity problem may try to renegotiate its debt. These
sort of renegotiations are more likely to succeed the fewer the number of creditors involved and
to the extent that they have common interests-e.g., same type of priority. See Alan Schwartz,
Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON, & FIN. 127, 136-38 (1997) (discussing
renegotiation issues between debtor firms and their creditors).
42. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2010) (defining insolvency of an entity as
the "financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than such entity's
property, at fair valuation").
43. While an insolvent firm can, in theory, can continue to operate until it experiences a
liquidity problem: until it runs out of cash or other liquid assets to pay its creditors, creditors can
force the insolvent firm into bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §303 (2010)
(involuntary filing).
44. A firm that is forced to sell its assets quickly will often have to sell them at a discount,
which not only exacerbates the liquidity problem but can lead to insolvency. See Jean Tirole,
Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON LIT. 287, 289 (2011) (discussing problem of market
liquidity).
45. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Gary Gorton, & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Risk
Topography 11 (Working Paper, Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825124
(discussing scenario in which bank is forced to post more collateral after a ratings downgrade).
46. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to suffer liquidity problems; moreover, high
leverage may signal to the market that the firm is borrowing funds because it is unable to
produce sufficient internal cash flows to fund its operations or is insolvent. See Zvi BODIE ET
AL., INVESTMENTS 472 (2005).
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leverage. 47 In fact, financial institutions routinely tie up their funds in
long-term commitments, such as long-term loans or insurance
contracts, which they finance in part by using short-term debt.
Since short-term debt is less risky than long-term debt and other
long-lasting financial contracts, institutions can make a profit by
borrowing at a relatively low rate and using those funds to enter into
long-term commitments, for which they can charge more. As long as
institutions have continued access to short-term funds, the maturity
mismatch between their operating capital and their contractual
commitment is of no material consequence. However, if an
institution begins to experience liquidity problems, the maturity
mismatch can quickly turn into significant problem, 48 that in some
instances can lead to its sudden failure.49 Intermediaries, such as
brokerage houses, can also suffer a liquidity shock if their customers
close their accounts and take their cash and securities to another
institution. It follows that part of the risk management task faced by
financial intermediaries involves monitoring short-term lenders and
customers, as well as other suppliers of capital and cash flows. A
bank can experience liquidity shocks if it fails to identify, on a timely
basis, changes in their depositor base, or increased regulatory anxiety
about its financial state of that of similarly situated institutions, and
concomitant changes in oversight and capital requirements. Part IV
examines two contexts in which group dynamics by short-term
lenders-depositors and repo lenders-can cause financial
institutions to experience liquidity shocks, which at an extreme can
lead them to fail.
47. See Robert C. Merton, Financial Intermediation in the Continuous-Time Model, in
CONTNuoUS-TIME FINANCE 337, 354 (1990) (discussing the various ways in which financial
institutions raise capital); JEAN TIROLE, supra note 26, at 98-99 (stating that banks have high
leverage ratios).
48. See Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and
Systemic Bailouts 2-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15138, July 2(K)9),
available at http://www.nber.org/papcrs/wl5138 (discussing maturity mismatch problems and
their effect on destabilizing financial institutions).
49. The sudden failures of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, and the ensuing financial
meltdown was triggered in part by liquidity problems. See Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin,
Illiquid Components of Credit Risks 29-31 (Working Paper, Sept. 2009), available at http://
madrid-cls-holder.wss.yalc.edu/Iec-lun/2009/morris-090930.pdf (discussing the decline over time
of the amount of cash and liquid assets held by financial institutions).
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D. THE Two-SIDED INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY PROBLEMS
PRESENT IN INTERMEDIATION TRANSACTIONS
Transactions involving intermediaries create a two-sided
informational asymmetry problem: Parties who rely on
intermediaries need to protect themselves against the informational
risks posed by the intermediaries; in turn, the intermediaries must
protect themselves from the informational risks posed by those
parties. More generally, intermediation transactions involve at least
three two-sided informational asymmetry problems. The first is
between the intermediary and its investors, lenders, and customers.
The second is between the intermediary and the borrowers and other
investors with whom they enter into long-term transactions, who are
exposed to counterparty risk, if the intermediary fails. The third two-
sided informational asymmetry problem involves the parties who
transact with the financial intermediary. Complete intermediation is,
in the end impossible. There always remains a portion of the
informational risk in the disinter-mediated plane: A depositor's
welfare is affected by the en masse loan defaults by the bank's
borrowers and the borrowers' welfare is affected by the disruption in
funding (and informational losses) created by bank runs or the bank's
orderly dissolution by the FDIC. Repo transactions, securitizations,
credit default swaps and other types of derivative transactions involve
analogous sorts of "transitive counterparty risks."s0
III. INVESTING IN INFORMATION
This Part begins by setting forth a general framework for
understanding financial decisions: They are inter-temporal decisions in
which actors use their current beliefs to make predictions about how
their environment and how they expect it to evolve over time. Over
time, a financial actor will revisit its past decisions making use of new
information to update its beliefs. It will then use those new beliefs to
determine the extent to which they need to adjust their investment
portfolio. But information is itself a type of investment: it requires the
actor to incur an immediate cost in return for a signal of uncertain
value. It follows, that like any other investment, an actor will choose
50. See Manuel A. Utset, Transitive Counterparty Risk and Financial Contracts, 78 BROOK.
L. REV. 1141 (2013) (developing model of transitive counter-party risk and applying it to the
context of financial intermediaries).
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not just how much information to acquire but also the optimal time to
do so. Waiting is sometimes the best course of action. The Part
therefore continues with an examination of the optimal time to invest
in information and the value of the option to delay the investment.
Financial institutions and financial contracts are often quite complex,
which means that the information needed to pierce through that
complexity can be expensive and in some cases not worth acquiring.
The Part concludes by examining various issues related to this
complexity.
A. MAKING FINANCIAL DECISIONS
Suppose that a financial actor is has available a number of
possible courses of action and wants to choose the one that will
maximize its intertemporal utility: each of these actions will produce an
immediate result, providing the actor with an instantaneous utility; it
will also produce potential positive or negative hits to its utility in
future periods." For example, a decision to buy a share of stock will
require an immediate disutility-the amount paid to make the
investment-and will yield an expected return in the future, which will
depend on the state of the environment that comes to pass. The net
return, and thus the effect on the actor's future utility, will depend on
how well the company performs during the life of that investment. The
actor's future utility will therefore depend on dividend payments
received over time, and the capital gain/loss when it sells the stock. A
rational actor will decide whether or not to purchase the stock at time t,
if doing so will maximize its aggregate, inter-temporal, utility in periods
t through t + n, where the latter is the date in which the actor sells the
stock.
During the time that it owns the stock, the actor may have one or
more available actions that will affect its inter-temporal utility. It
may, for instance, acquire information about the company's financial
health, and use what it learns to make subsequent decisions, such as
selling the stock earlier than planned, hedging, carrying out a proxy
battle, bringing a lawsuit, or purchasing additional shares. An actor's
51. A rational actor will take an action in the current period if it is inter-temporally
worthwhile: if, given her belief of how she plans to act in the future, the action maximizes her
current and future well-being. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and
Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, 128 (2001) (setting up a general model where people act
with reasonable beliefs about future actions and choose current actions to maximize preferences
in light of those beliefs).
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inter-temporal utility therefore will depend on how it acts initially and
in subsequent periods, and everything else beyond its control, which
we will refer to as the actor's environment.5 2
An actor's decision will depend on it beliefs" regarding: (1) the
current state of the decision environment;54 (2) the actions available
to it, to reduce its level of uncertainty" (including hedging against
possible outcomes); and (3) how its actions will affect that
environment. 6  One way to reduce this uncertainty is to invest in
information. 7 The actor pays a certain amount at time t, to receive a
52. More generally, an environment can be characterized as a system-a set of components,
each in some relation with others. Each of these components may be considered its own
environment, to the extent that it is composed of other components, and so on until one
bottoms out at a set of primitive components. This sort of compositional approach to
"constructing" environments helps reduce their overall complexity. See C. A. R. HOARE,
COMMUNICATING SEQUENTIAL PROCESSES 45 (2004) (stating that compositional design helps
reduce complexity of reasoning about complex concurrent systems by treating equally all
relationships between observer and environments, and arguing that a "complete system should
also be regarded as a process, whose range of behaviour is definable in terms of the behaviour
of its component processes; and the system may in turn be placed within a yet wider
environment").
53. The actor will attach subjective probability assessments based on its beliefs about the
current state it holds at the time. More generally, a person will want to know whether or not
certain propositions about his environment are true-i.e., that they are true in the current state
of the environment. See Eddie Dekel & Frank Gul, Rationality and Knowledge in Game
Theory, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS,
SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS 87, 99-101 (David M Kreps & Kenneth F. Wallis, eds. 1997)
(describing Kripke model of knowledge). A belief is a type of disposition to assent to certain
propositions about it. If A believes that X is true, then they would assent to the following
proposition: "X is true." To say that X believes that Napoleon lost at Waterloo just means that
X has the disposition to answer yes if asked: "Did Napoleon lose at Waterloo?" See WILLARD
VAN ORMAN QUINE & JOSEPH SILBERT ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 10 (2d ed. 1978) (stating
that a person has belief X if he has a disposition to assent to questions regarding those beliefs);
Radu J. Bogdan, The Manufacture of Belief, in BELIEF: FORM, CONTENT AND FUNCTION 149,
160-61 (Badu J. Bogdan ed. 1986) (stating that beliefs "track" certain facts or information about
the real world).
54. A decision-maker who has no beliefs about his environment will find it impossible to
choose between different courses of action. At the same time, a person who believes that his
actions will have no effect whatsoever will have no reason to act. See FRED DRETSKE,
EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR: REASONS IN A WORLD OF CAUSES 79 (1988) (arguing that a model of
belief should, in the end, "reveal the way in which what we believe helps to determine what we
do"); FRANK RAMSEY, THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ESSAYS
238 (1931) ("[a] belief [is a] map of the neighbouring space by which we steer").
55. The process can lead it to conclude that it needs to update its beliefs about the
environment. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 67-69 (1993) (discussing
various reasons for privileging true beliefs, but stating that in some rare contexts having false
beliefs can make someone better off).
56. See NOZICK, supra note 55, at 99 ("beliefs about the world feed forward into actions,
and the (perceived) results of these actions . . . feedback, positively or negatively, upon
beliefs").
57. See ARROW, supra note 16, at 37-38 (an economic actor starts with certain expectations
about set of signals that it can receive in the future and a probability distribution of receiving
420 Vol. 10:2
RATIONAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWNS
signal, at time t +1. As with any investment, a rational actor will
purchase that signal only if the immediate costs are less than the
expected benefits. An actor that receives a very noisy signalP8 may
not learn anything valuable, and may end up knowing less about the
environment's true state; a very precise signal, on the other hand may
reveal, the actual state.
In addition, to the type of signal that it expects to receive, the
actor will also need to take into account the costs of processing the
information and using it in its deliberation process. Some signals are
difficult to interpret (to attach a precise meaning to information
received); others may require added work to incorporate into the
actor's existing information set, or to use in making a decision-
deliberation take time and effort, both of which produce disutility.
Moreover, some pieces of information may trigger negative emotions
such as anxiety and regret.
Finally, an actor will take into account that the information that
it is acquiring is timely. A signal is timely, only if the actor can use it
to make a decision: For example, if the signal is received after the
decision deadline or takes the actor too long to process and put into
use. Moreover, an actor can receive a signal too soon: An actor who
is unable to act before a specific point in time, will thus need to
account for the likelihood that the information will become partly or
fully stale (in the sense that it no longer provides as accurate an
assessment of the environment's true state).59 For example, the
efficient capital markets hypothesis states that information about
companies whose following among analysts and expert traders is deep
will become stale very quickly, sometimes within seconds. 60
We can thus look at the actor's decisions as taken place in three
the different signals; "information" is a signal that leads the actor to update that probability
assessment); over those signals, based on their current beliefs; "information" is a signal that
leads an actor to make changes to that probability distribution); JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G.
RILEY, THE ANALYTICS AND UNCERTAINTY OF INFORMATION 170-78 (1992) (describing
process by which people revise their beliefs to account for new information).
58. see JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS 47 (1972)
("[as a general matter,] information will give only a partial description of the state of the
world").
59. Cf. Steve Furr, What is Real Time and Why Do I Need it?, ONX, www.qnx.com/
developers/articles/article_298_1.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (drawing a distinction between
hard and soft real-time systems; in the former case, information that is not acquired by specified
deadline loses all its value, while in the soft system information depreciates in value).
60. An inter-temporal decision is one in which the consequences or payoffs accrue at
different points in time. See George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, 3
J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 181 (1989) (defining inter-temporal choices as "decisions in which the
timing of costs and benefits are spread out over time").
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periods: At time t, it will decide whether or not to make an
investment in information; if it does, a time t + 1, it will receive an
information signal and either process it and use it to make a decision
(or ignore it); if it decides to use it, the actor will carry out an action
at time t + 2, using that information. A rational actor will make an
investment at time t, it the immediate costs of purchasing the
information signal is less than the net expected benefits from using it.
The latter will depend, in turn on the benefits received at time t + 2
minus the aggregate costs a t + 1 (such as processing, deliberation,
and emotional costs). It will also depend on the signal's timeliness.
B. THE OPTIMAL TIME TO INVEST IN INFORMATION
A decision to invest in information, therefore, has the following
important characteristics. First, it involves an inter-temporal
decision. Second, an information signal has uncertain payoffs. Third,
the investment is costly to reverse, in the sense that once the actor has
paid for the signal at time t, it cannot undo its decision, if the signal has
little useful information about the environment, or if it no longer needs
the information -if it has changed its mind about whether to undertake
the underlying action, such as buying or selling stock, or it has received
the information in some other way. In some instances, an actor can
salvage part of its investment by selling the information to a third party.
Third, in many types of contexts involving financial actors, there is
flexibility about the timing of investing in information. A rational
actor, therefore will make two general decisions: whether or not it is
worthwhile to acquire information; and the optimal timing for doing so.
In choosing the optimal time, the actor will take into account the
following factors. First, the immediate costs of acquiring the
information, and the extent to which it can reverse part of the
investment, by selling the information to a third party. The actor is
more likely to delay the greater the net, irreversible investment. The
second factor is the costs from delaying-if the actor can make the
underlying decisions immediately after acquiring and processing the
information, and that decision will begin to produce returns
immediately. The greater these foregone returns, the greater the
actor's incentive to invest in information, without waiting. Third,
delay, buys time, whose value depends on the likelihood that the actor
will make a different decision after the delay than the one it would
make beforehand.
Suppose that the actor will acquire the shares only if the
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company's expected earnings are at least $1 million, and that
purchasing a signal at time t would tell the actor that that the
expected earnings are either $10 million or a loss of $8 million, each
with a fifty percent likelihood; also suppose that waiting for the
company to issue the earnings report will allow the investor to know
for sure which of the two actually occurred. Instead suppose that the
signal, at time t, would tell the actor that the company would have an
average profit of $1 million, but with a lower variance: the company
has a profit of either $2 million or $0, each with fifty percent
probability. The option value of delaying making the investment if
greater under the first scenario, and thus, the actor is willing to pay
more for the signal if it believes that it is facing such a high variance
scenario. The value of the information depends in short on the
actor's ability to avoid the downside loss; if the company's losses
money, then it will forego the investment.
One would thus expect that financial actors will spend less in
acquiring information during economic booms, since all other things
being equal, the downside risks of making an investment without the
information is not as great. At the same time, during a bust, the value
of the information becomes much greater given the greater downside
risks of making an investment "blindly." It follows, that financial
actors will have an incentive to delay investing in information during
economic booms and to over-invest in it during busts. The former
can lead to the prolonging of asset bubbles; the latter can lead to
more severe busts.
C. COMPLEXITY AND THE OPTION TO DELAY INVESTING IN
INFORMATION
We have assumed that rational financial actors choose the course
of action that will maximize their inter-temporal utility and that they
make decisions within a transactional environment, at a particular
point in time.61 An environment's complexity depends on the number
of parts it comprises and the manner in which these interact. Suppose
that two environments have the same number of parts, but that in the
first it is relatively more difficult for an observer to make sense of the
dependency between the myriad parts; then that first environment is
61. see JON BARWISE, THE SITUATION IN LOGIC, at xiv (1989) (developing "situation
logic" in which actors find themselves within a context or situation-i.e., "portions of reality"-
at a specific point in time).
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a more complex one.6 2 A fully rational actor who has determined that
the benefits of using a piece of information exceed the costs will take
the time and effort to process and use that information. But
deciphering a complex environment takes time and effort, and a
certain level of computational ability. As information increases in
complexity, the greater the chance that an actor will run out of time
before it is able to process it and incorporate it into the deliberation
process."
Complexity will increase the immediate costs of investing in
information, and as a result will increase the value of actor's option to
delay." This is important because the sort of inter-temporal decisions
made by financial actors can quickly increase in complexity, given
that a decision-maker has to make sense of its current and expected
future preferences and the way that the environment may change
over time. The level of complexity of inter-temporal decisions will
tend to increase with the number of time periods involved, their
length, and the interconnection between them.
62. Herbert Simon defined a complex system as "one made up of a large number of parts
that have many interactions," where its complexity will increase because, "whenever the
properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the
properties of the whole." HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 183-84,207
(3rd ed. 1996).
63. In short, boundedly rational actors will engage in "satisficing" behavior by not using
some of the information available to them. Id. at 29 (describing the boundedly rational
decision-maker as "a satisficer, a person who accepts 'good enough' alternatives, not because
less is preferred to more but because there is no choice"); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
THOUGHT 3 (1979) (starting with the "observation that human thinking powers are very modest
when compared with the complexities of the environments in which human beings live" and
describing the way they adapt to these computational constraints by using only a subset of the
available and relevant information set). One approach to reducing the cognitive load needed to
make decisions within complex environments is to use "rules of thumb" or heuristics that are
well suited for the task at hand. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds. 1982) (arguing that heuristics
have benefits and costs, and can lead to systematic-i.e., non-random-deviations from rational
behavior). All other things being equal, the use of heuristics will increase with the complexity of
the environment. See, e.g., John W. Payne, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in
Decision Making: An Information Search and Protocol Analysis, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 366, 384 (1976) (showing that "increases in the complexity of a decision
situation will result in decision makers resorting to choice heuristics in an effort to reduce
cognitive strain").
64. See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
ECON. LIT. 315, 351-53 (2009) (summarizing empirical evidence of the role played by
complexity and bounded rationality in financial markets).
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D. COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL
CONTRACTS
Even small financial institutions can be highly complex entities."
The majority of the assets of financial institutions are financial in
nature;6 these assets are more volatile and difficult to understand and
value, since their value, at any one point in time depends on a large
number of future states of the world. 7 It follows, that, as a general
matter, financial assets have greater complexity than the tangible
assets held by nonfinancial firms. A financial institution's liabilities
also tend to be complex given that large portions of them are held by
its customers,68 and that some of them are not reported on their
balance sheets.69  Moreover, the value of an institution's assets and
the burden of its liabilities can fluctuate very rapidly, depending on
the behavior of markets and regulators, as well as the institution's
organizational structure.7 0
65. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, 34 http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf (arguing that the complexity of institu-
tions has made it increasingly difficult for regulators to exercise effective oversight).
66. For example, the assets of commercial banks consist primarily of mortgages and
consumer and commercial loans. See James Tobin, Financial Intermediaries, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 340, 342 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1987) (describing
the balance sheets of financial intermediaries as almost completely "paper" on both sides-
securities and other financial claims as opposed to real assets-and the assets of commercial
banks as comprising primarily mortgages, commercial loans, and consumer credit). The assets
of insurance companies are primarily in the form of securities and other financial contracts
securities. Richard D. Phillips et al., Financial Pricing of Insurance in the Multiple-Line
Insurance Company, 65 J. RISK & INS. 597, 602 (1998) (describing the assets of an insurance
company as primarily interest and dividend paying securities).
67. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 97-100 (2000) (arguing that contractual complexity increases
with "(1) the expected number of payoff-relevant contingencies specified in the contract; [and]
(2) the variance in the magnitude of the payoffs contracted to flow between the parties," since
these create more states of the world for a decision-maker to take into account).
68. See ROBERT C. MERTON, CONTINUOUS-TIME FINANCE 451 (Blackwell Publishers Inc.
2nd rev. ed. 1992) (1990) ("[T]he vast bulk of a typical intermediary's liabilities are held by its
customers."). The level of complexity is increased by the fact that financial institutions
sometimes trade for their own accounts, something that can create conflicts of interests with
their customers. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619,
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. V 2011) (restricting the ability of financial institutions to engage in
certain types of proprietary trading).
69. Off-balance sheet liabilities make a financial institution's financial statements less
transparent and thus increase the cognitive difficulty of determining an institution's leverage
and risk of insolvency. See Hyun Song Shin, Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That
Heralded the Global Financial Crisis, 23 J. EcON PERSP. 101, 105-08 (2009) (discussing role of
off-balance sheet liabilities in the period leading to the Great Recession of 2007-2009).
70. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, CONTAINING SYSTEMATIC RISK:
THE ROAD TO REFORM 41, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/164804031/section-ii-stan
dards-for-accounting-consolidation (stating that consolidating financial statements of a parent
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Additionally, financial institutions are interconnected through
contractual arrangements, such as loan or debt contracts and financial
derivatives, and spot transactions, such as trading; they are also
interconnected indirectly, through their reliance on the same sources
of capital and markets to dispose of assets.71 The failure of one
financial institution can put other institutions at risk,72 and even
relatively small shocks to one part of the financial system can quickly
spread to others, precipitating a financial crisis: A large, material
change in the overall or aggregate state of a financial system arising
from a relatively small change in the system. 73 For example, banks
routinely lend and borrow from each other, both locally and
internationally, a practice aimed at reducing liquidity risks, but one
that can also lead to financial crises.74
and its subsidiaries can "obscure those assets and liabilities that are truly impacting the
economic performance and financial position of the consolidated enterprise," hide which entity
is actually exposed to market risks, and lead to larger, more complex balance sheets that "can
obscure individual amounts").
71. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking the
Financial Network, Address at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam 28 (Apr. 2009),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf (using a
social network approach to model the growing interconnection between institutions).
72. The likelihood that a financial shock will spill over to other parts of the system is called
"systemic risk." See Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 3-4 (2008) (statement of
Andrew Lo) (defining systemic risk as the risk of a "broad-based breakdown in the financial
system, often realized as a series of correlated defaults among financial institutions, typically
banks, that occurs over a short period of time and typically caused by a single major event");
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as the
"risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of
significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility").
73. See BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 2, at 220 (describing financial crises that began with
small incidents that spread into a system-wide crisis). The mechanism through which shocks get
propagated throughout one or more financial systems is referred to as "contagion." See
generally Marcello Pericoli & Massimo Sbracia, A Primer on Financial Contagion, 17 J. ECON.
SURVS. 571 (2003) (positing a theoretical framework for financial contagion); IDENTIFYING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 3-4 (Mardi Dungey
& Demosthenos Tambakis eds., 2005) (providing the definition of contagion, but stating that
there is broad disagreement in the literature as to the actual parameters of the term); FRANKLIN
ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 230-31 (2007) (describing
twin crises involving banks and currency markets and summarizing the literature on this topic).
74. See Philippe Aghion et al., Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System, 44 EUR.
ECON. REv. 713, 715-17 (2000) (developing a global-coordination-failure model of contagion in
which the failure of one bank can lead depositors to conclude that failure due to liquidity
problems exists in the whole banking system); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial
Contagion, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2000) (developing a model which predicts that interbank
markets help decrease the probability of individual bank failure but increase the likelihood of
financial contagion); see also FREIXAS & ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 191 (1997)
(distinguishing between a "bank run" affecting one bank and a "bank panic" affecting the whole
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Finally, modern financial products are often created by
combining two or more simpler contracts-or sets of promises-into
a more complex one are by nature more difficult to understand and
value." Competition among institutions76 can lead to the introduction
of new, and increasingly complex financial contracts before they are
properly stress tested to discover potential problems.77  These
contracts often involve a larger number of parties who are
interconnected with each other in manners that are difficult to
discern .7
III. RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND INTERMEDIATION
This Part begins by examining the collective action problem
faced by financial actors entering into complex transactions: At an
individual level it is often rational to transfer the informational risks
to a third party and enter into the transaction "blindly" -i.e., without
acquiring information about one or more material transactional risks.
However, if a sufficient number of actors choose to transact blindly
the group of financial actors within the system will be made worse off.
The last section looks at the incentive of financial regulators to delay
monitoring and disciplining financial institutions.
banking industry).
75. See Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in
Financial Products 1 (Feb. 5, 2012), available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-rongge/deriva
tivelatest.pdf (unpublished manuscript) ("The practical downside of derivatives is that they are
complex assets that are difficult to price.").
76. See Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A
Counterfactual Research Agenda, 3 ANN. REV. FIN ECON. 41, 78 (2011) ("[S jecuritization was
part of a larger set of innovations that constitute the so-called shadow banking system in which
market-based financial intermediaries replaced traditional banks.").
77. Untested and poorly understood financial products can threaten the reliability of
existing risk management systems. If these systems are not updated in a timely fashion, they can
give managers a false sense of security and lead them to enter into transactions that they would
have avoided had they known about the true extent of the risks involved. One reason why
investment banks may rush to market new financial products is that once a product becomes
public other investment banks can copy it and sell it to their own clients. It is much more
difficult to get effective intellectual property protection of financial innovations than it is for
standard innovations. As a result, the first investment bank to reach the market with a new
product will be able to acquire some market share and reputational capital before others copy
its innovation. See Allen & Gale, supra note 74, at 45-56. It is, however, possible to get patent
protection on some types of financial innovations. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (allowing patents on a financial innovation to
consolidate information flow among group of mutual funds), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
78. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, supra note 70, at 4 (describing the
complexity faced by financial institutions in the day-to-day risk management of portfolios of
complex securities).
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A. THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND "BLIND"
HEDGING
A party entering into a financial transaction faces informational
risks that it can deal with directly by acquiring information" or
indirectly by transferring the informational risks to a financial
intermediary, which in turn will deal with those risks directly by
screening and monitoring investments or by delegating to another
intermediary, and so on. These risks transfers include a party's
purchasing of credit default swaps or entering into other types of
hedging transactions. An actor will choose the direct route only to
the extent that the net benefits from achieving greater transparency
exceed the net benefits from hedging. In other words, a rational actor
will invest in transparency only up to the point at which the marginal
benefits of doing so equal marginal costs.s0 All other things being
equal, the greater the complexity the more likely that a party will
choose to transfer the informational risk to an intermediary or find
some other way of hedging.8' Similarly, the lower the costs of
intermediation and hedging the more likely that a party will choose
that route. At an extreme, a party can enter into a transaction fully
informed or fully "blind," or by choosing some combination of both.12
The greater the number of parties involved in dealing with a
particular informational risk, the greater the complexity and thus the
greater the likelihood that parties will continue to choose to transfer
the risk instead of trying to pierce through the complexity. That is, at
some point, one would expect a financial system to reach a tipping
point in which it becomes too expensive to deal with transactional
risks through direct due diligence; and that at some further point
down the line the number of "blind" transactions become so great
79. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 200-06 (1992) (describing different approaches used by decision-makers for
determining whether to acquire additional information before making a terminal choice and the
value of potential information).
80. See, e.g., JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS 85-86
(1972) (describing way of comparing different types of information structures to ascertain the
value of information).
81. See generally Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia,
and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006) (discussing the
general problems inherent in creating transparency when products have multiple attributes).
82. See TIROLE, supra note 26, at 15 (arguing that a party can address informational
asymmetry problems in two nonmutually exclusive ways: aligning the interest of the other party
with its own, or acquiring information to help it monitor and discipline the other party).
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that those providing hedging services will either exit the market or
charge much larger premiums. But a system with a sufficiently large
number of "open" blind transactions can quickly become unstable.
This is because these blind transactions, while rational, at the
individual level, will lead to aggregate informational deficits at the
group level, a problem that is made worse the longer that a group of
actors have relied on remaining rationally ignorant. The group of
actors that comprise a financial system-such as financial institutions,
nonfinancial firms, consumers, government borrowers, and
regulators-are better off collectively if information about each of the
systemically important participants is gathered, evaluated, and put to
use in a timely fashion: before the system has experienced a sudden
meltdown. Dealing with transactional risks using blind solutions, in
short, can lead to systemic risk and financial crises.
B. INCENTIVE OF REGULATORS TO DELAY MONITORING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
There are four principal reasons why regulators may choose to
delay in monitoring and disciplining financial institutions. The first
reason is regulatory capture. There is a large literature dealing with
regulatory capture. The basic idea is that regulators, regulated
parties, and the beneficiaries of the regulation find themselves in a
repeat game with each other in which the regulated parties and
regulators have an incentive to collude with each other at the expense
of the protected parties. One explanation given for this sort of
collusion is that protected parties are usually dispersed consumers
who face a collective action problem in monitoring and disciplining
regulators, while the regulated industry players are fewer in number
and hold similar regulatory interests, both of which make it easier for
them to collude with each other (which is the necessary first step
before they are able to collude with regulators).
The second reason that regulators may delay monitoring and
disciplining errant financial institutions is that they have limited
budgetary resources. Moreover, during good economic times it is
more likely that Congress will cut back on budgets meant to monitor
and discipline financial institutions. One reason for this is that such
expenditures may be deemed as wasteful because of a belief that
aggressive regulatory monitoring will find nothing. A second reason
is that aggressive enforcement can lead financial institutions to forego
socially valuable risky behavior, something that can prevent good
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projects from getting financed and new financial innovations making
it to the market. Related to this is the incentive of regulated parties
to use these "good times" to lobby for greater deregulation. In other
words, in good economic times, "deregulation entrepreneurs" will
have an incentive to expend resources to convince lawmakers and
administrators either to deregulate outright or to under-enforce
existing regulations."'
A third reason why regulators may choose to delay disciplining
financial institutions is that it can lead the regulator to suffer a
reputation loss. When financial institutions are financial trouble, it is
often difficult for third parties to determine whether the institution
reached that state due to lax regulatory oversight or because while
regulators did their job as best they could, managers were able to hide
these problems the regulators. As a result, once the regulator finds
out that the financial institutions is in a bad state it can either act
immediately, which would yield an immediate reputational loss,8 or
delay publicly disciplining the institution. As long as there is a
sufficiently high probability that the institution will be able to get past
its current financial problems, both the regulator and the managers
will have an incentive to delay-i.e., they will both have a valuable
real option. Moreover, this general problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the general fragility of financial institutions and possibility of
a bank run provides additional justification for delaying making the
financial problems public. The problem is that it is difficult for a third
party to verify whether the regulator's delay was due to her career
concerns or to legitimate regulatory reasons.
A fourth reason for regulatory inertia is due not to actual
strategic behavior by regulators but because of coordination failures
83. Some commentators have argued that after economic crises "regulation entrepreneurs"
emerge who lobby for the adoption of new regulations. The underlying premise of many of
these arguments is that these new regulations are unnecessary or ill-conceived, since they will be
a rush to get them adopted. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (making argument
regarding regulation entrepreneurs). It is not at all clear why the problem is not a symmetrical
one: During good times, well-financed industry lobbyists will have an incentive to act as
deregulation entrepreneurs. This creates an important problem for any regulatory regime. It is
impossible for those adopting the regulations in bad time to precommit to fully enforce them or
not repeal them in good times. A rational regulated party will take into account this probability
of under-enforcement and deregulation when choosing how to act during good economic times.
This will lead to riskier behavior than would be rational in a world of regular or full
enforcement.
84. The magnitude of this loss will depend on the regulator's ability to credibly signal that
the financial institution reached that state notwithstanding the fact that she engaged in proper
oversight.
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between multiple regulators. For example, financial institutions and
derivative securities are regulated by multiple regulators. Whenever
there are multiple regulators, there may be coordination failures due
to beliefs that another regulator is actually taking care of the
problem. In other words, it may be the case that each regulator is
doing their job in properly regulating the institutions under their
jurisdiction, but only to the extent that those institutions have no
relationships with those regulated by other agencies. Once one
creates the potential for these interconnections, then there is a need
to have system-wide coordination between the various regulators.
This general problem extends beyond regulators to other monitors.
For example, if regulators believe that shareholders, creditors, and
customers are actively monitoring the managers of financial
institutions, they will conclude that they can exercise less oversight.
However if each of these monitors believes this, then they will each
have an incentive to free ride on the monitoring activities of the
other. This collective action problem will lead to under-monitoring.
As mentioned above these financial actors are less likely to monitor
during good economic times. For example, Shareholders and
creditors are more likely to conclude that actively monitoring
managers will yield very little information of value. But unlike
regulators, shareholders and creditors are able to exit the relationship
once they find out that there are problems. Therefore they will have
an incentive to delay starting their monitoring until they have
received new information showing that there is a sufficient number of
market participants who know that others know that the good times
are coming to an end; that is, until it becomes common knowledge.85
IV. FINANCIAL MELTDOWNS DUE TO GROUP
DYNAMICS AND STRATEGIC DELAYS IN DISCLOSING
INFORMATION
This Part begins by analyzing two contexts in which financial
institutions can suffer sudden liquidity and solvency problems, both of
which depend on group pathologies. It then discusses the incentive
faced by financial actors to delay disclosing information to others
within the financial system. These strategic delays can in turn
exacerbate the group pathology problems, given that these are driven
by informational deficits faced by parties transacting with financial
85. See DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
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intermediaries. The last section discusses two complexity issues that
can exacerbate these group pathologies: the complexity associated
with solving coordination problems, and that associated with legal
rules and private governance mechanisms.
A. BANKS AND BANK RUNS
Traditionally, commercial banks main business involved two
types of transactions: borrowing funds from depositors, on a short-
term basis, and using those funds to make loans to firms and
households in need of capital.86 In making these loans, the bank acts
as a financial intermediary, since it funds the loans using a portion of
the depositors' funds; the bank keeps the rest of the depositors' funds
on "reserve," in case depositors want to withdraw them. While
depositors can demand repayment immediately, whenever they want
to,87 the bank cannot demand repayment of the principal before the
end of the loan term unless the borrower has defaulted.8 By turning
some of the depositors' funds into illiquid assets-loans-the bank
creates a potential liquidity problem: if all depositors decide to
withdraw their funds at the same time, the bank will not have enough
to go around. 89 More generally, if a sufficiently large number of
depositors believe, correctly or incorrectly, that other depositors
believe that a bank is in financial distress and plan to withdraw their
funds, they will try to win the race to the deposit window, in order to
86. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 74 (defining a bank as a firm whose "operation
consists in granting loans and receiving deposits from the public"). The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 defines a "bank" as an "insured bank" under the FDIC Act or any
institution organized under Federal or state law which both accepts demand deposits and is in
the business of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (c)(1) (2011). Under the FDIC Act,
an "insured bank" is a state or federally chartered bank whose deposits are insured by the
FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(a) and (h) (2011).
87. The standard type of bank account is a "demand deposit" account, which allows the
depositor to withdraw funds from the account by making an appropriate request to the bank.
See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(b) (2009) (defining a "demand deposit" as a deposit with a bank that is
payable on demand).
88. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 430, 435 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds. 2003) (describing
the differences between securities issued to borrowers and lenders).
89. If a federally insured depositary institution, such as a bank, becomes insolvent, the
customer's deposits will be protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, up to a
pre-defined amount. See Deposit Insurance Regulations; Permanent Increase in Standard
Coverage Amount; Advertisement of Membership; International Banking; Foreign Banks, 75
Fed. Reg. 156,49,363 (Aug. 13, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330), https://www.feder
alregister.gov/articles/2010/08/13/2010-20008/deposit-insurance-regulations-permanent-increase-
instandard-coverage-amount-advertisement-of.
Vol. 10:2432
RATIONAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWNS
assure that they can get their money out before the bank runs out of
funds. This sort of behavior will trigger a "bank run."" In order to
reduce the risks of insolvency and bank runs,91 bank regulators
provide depositors with insurance 92 through the FDIC93 and banks
with access to the Federal Reserve's discount window, from which
they can borrow funds. 94  They also subject banks to monitoring,95
prudential regulations,96 and minimum capital requirements,97 all of
which have the effect of limiting a bank's leverage, total loan
exposures, and ability to expand into nonbanking businesses.8
Before the advent of securitization and loan participations, a
bank's loan portfolio was a relatively illiquid asset.99 But the liquidity
90. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POLITICAL ECON. 401, 401 (1983) (defining a bank run as a situation in which
"depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail"). See also
FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 94-96 (2007)
(summarizing the literature on bank runs).
91. There are two important institutional features of banks that can increase the risk of a
run: the fractional reserve system and the "first-come, first-served" policy for depositors wishing
to withdraw their funds. The latter creates a sort of race-to-the-deposit-window that can lead to
bank runs, notwithstanding the fact that the bank is actually in good financial health. See Jean-
Charles Rochet, Bank Runs and Financial Crises: A Discussion, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION,
AND THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND PERSPECTIVES 324, 324-325 (Sudipto Bhattacharya
et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that fractional reserve system is principal reason for general fragility
of banks); Yehning Chen, Banking Panics: The Role of the First-Come, First-Served Rule and
Information Externalities, 107 J. POL. ECON. 946, 947-49 (1999) (discussing the repercussions of
the first-come first-scrve system on bank runs and bank panics more generally).
92. Deposit insurance provides the main line of defense against bank runs. If depositors
know that their deposits are protected they will no longer withdraw their funds merely because
of a fear that the bank will run out of funds. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 90, at 413-16.
A bank run may nonetheless be socially beneficial if it leads to the dissolution of an insolvent
bank that has no positive value as a going concern. See Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner,
Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs, 60 J. FIN. 1293, 1295 (2005)
(contrasting efficient and inefficient bank runs).
93. Under the FDIC Act, an "insured bank" is a state or federally chartered bank whose
deposits are insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a), (h) (2006). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1821
(2006) (providing for deposit insurance for insured banks).
94. See Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown, & Paul Pfleiderer, Liability Holding
Companies, 59 UCLA L. REV. 852, 870 (2012) (describing ban "safety net" including deposit
insurance and access to Federal Reserve's discount window).
95. See M. Todd Henderson, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1016
n.45 (2012) (quoting FDIC report describing the role of the FDIC in monitoring insured
financial institutions).
96. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30
(2010) (discussing role played by prudential regulation of financial institutions).
97. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 74, at 272-74 (discussing regulatory capital
requirements).
98. See Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in various
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
99. See Elena Loutskina, The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding
Management, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 663, 664-69 (2011).
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provided by the selling loans and through other types of short-term
borrowings, such as repos, can quickly dry up if the securitization,
loan participation, and repo markets contract quickly, as they did in
2007 and 2008.
As a result, an important part of risk management of banks is
trying to predict how the inflow and outflow of deposits and loan
proceeds may vary at different points in the future. This includes
trying to anticipate changes in the business cycle and other
macroeconomic shocksoo and in the riskiness of the bank's deposit
and loan portfolios, including liquidity shocks to consumers and
businesses and reductions in the value or liquidity of collateral on
which the bank is overly dependent (e.g., mortgages).101 After the
freezing of the repo and securitization markets in the 2007-2008
financial meltdown, and the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act,102
federal regulators require banks and other financial institutions 03 to
adopt risk management practices that take into account all sources of
100. See Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of The Basel 11 Capital
Standards, ECON. PERSPECTIVES 18, 21 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) (1st Quarter, 2004)
(arguing that instead of setting capital requirements based on a single, static risk curve,
regulators should instead use "a family of point-in-time risk curves, with each curve
corresponding ... to different macroeconomic conditions").
101. See Evan Gatev, Til Schuermann & Philip E. Strahan, Managing Bank Liquidity Risk:
How Deposit-Loan Synergies Vary with Market Conditions, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 995, 1000-03
(2009) (summarizing literature on relationship between bank depositors and borrowers,
particularly during changes in business cycle that can affect value of loan portfolio).
102. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
103. Investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, and finance
subsidiaries of business firms are all examples of firms whose business have some banking
characteristics-making loans or taking deposits-and are thus known as "shadow banks."
Investment banks and finance subsidiaries either make loans or routinely enter into transactions
that are the functional equivalent of a loan. Additionally, clients of mutual funds, investment
banks, and insurance companies can open money market accounts that are very similar to the
demand deposit accounts of banks. However, until the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act,
shadow banks are not subject to the capital requirements and prudential regulations of federal
banking statutes, either because they do not own a chartered bank or insured institution or
because they fall under some other regulatory exemption. This in turn gave shadow banks a
competitive advantage over commercial banks, and forced the latter to adopt riskier business
practices in order to effectively compete with other institutions. See Hedge Funds, Systemic
Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Andrew Lo) (describing shadow banking
system); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When "Banks" and "Banking" are Not the Same, 10
OXFORD REV. ECON 106, 111-13 (1994) (describing result on bank behavior from increased
competition from shadow banks and arguing that given that many nonbank financial
institutions engage in the types of activity usually carried out by regulated banks, one needs to
adopt functional regulations that track "banking activities").
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funds" that can dry out quickly'05 due to disruptions in markets'" or
the failure of systemically important institutions.07
B. DEMAND DEPOSITS VS. REPOS
A demand deposit is a loan from a depositor to the bank with an
infinitesimally small maturity: It is rolled over automatically, second-
by-second, 0 until the depositor cancels to the loan. Additionally, as
we have seen, demand deposits are insured by the FDIC, which in
essence collateralizes the loan with a claim against the government
for the insured amount.109 As long as the depositor keeps within the
insured limits, it can lend money to a bank blindly, without screening
it ex ante or monitoring it ex post."o In the period leading to the
financial meltdown of 2007-2008, it became increasingly popular for
both insured and non-insured institutions to borrow on a short-term
basis, without having to build an insured depositor base. A principal
104. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(A) (requiring the Federal Reserve to adopt heightened
prudential standards for systemically important institutions, including risk-based capital
requirements and leverage limits, liquidity requirements, risk-management requirements,
resolution plan and credit exposure report requirements, and concentration limits).
105. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(B) (authorizing Federal Reserve to adopt heighted
prudential standards to deal with sudden changes in an institution's sources of capital, including
contingent capital requirements and short-term debt limits).
106. Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(1) (describing duties of Financial Stability Council to include
making recommendations to primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened
standards and safeguards for financial activities or practices that could create or increase risks of
significant liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank holding companies,
nonbank financial companies, and United States financial markets").
107. Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1), (a)(4)(A) (defining "bank holding company" and "foreign
nonbank financial company," respectively); id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (defining "nonbank financial
company supervised by the Board of Governors" as a nonbank financial company that the
Financial Stability Oversight Council has determined shall be supervised by the Board of
Governors); id. at § 102(a)(7) (delegating to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to define
"significant nonbank financial companies" and "significant bank holding companies").
108. With the advent of automated banking, depositors have access to their funds at any
time; although for security reasons, banks imposed limits on withdrawals from ATMs during
off-hours, the depositor with access to online banking can always transfer all of its funds from
one institution to another. While the wire transfer may not occur instantaneously, the main
point remains: A depositor can withdraw its liquidity from the bank at any point, with a few
possible delays due to the reasons mentioned.
109. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 90, at 402-03.
110. A depositor who needs instant liquidity and cannot wait for the FDIC to pay out the
insurance may still bear some counterparty risk and will weigh the costs of doing some minimal
monitoring against those of diversifying its funds by opening accounts with different banks.
Given the limits imposed by the FDIC insurance, wealthy households already do this. See
Lawrence M. Benveniste & Allen N. Berger, Securitization with Recourse: An Instrument that
Offers Uninsured Bank Depositors Sequential Claims, 11 J. BANKING & FIN. 403 (1987)
(discussing how large account holders can protect themselves by diversifying their deposits
across banks).
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borrowing source is the repo market, which allows financial
institutions to raise short-term funds using securities as collateral.
In a repo, the "borrower" sells a security to the "lender,"
agreeing to repurchase it at some point in the future."' The two
agreements are structured so that a repo is functionally equivalent to
a short-term secured loan,1 12 with the security acting as collateral. The
collateral may range from relatively safe and liquid securities, such as
Treasury bills, to riskier ones, such as asset-backed securities."' If the
borrower defaults on her repurchase obligation, the lender will sell
the security"4 and thus bears the risk of a decline in value or an
inability to resell."' In order to deal with this risk, a repo lender can
demand additional collateral or higher, both which will reduce the
borrower's ability to increase her leverage. This in turn may put a
borrower at a disadvantage vis-A-vis other financial firms that can
achieve a greater amount of leverage.1 '6 Alternatively, the lender can
demand a shorter maturity. If the maturity is sufficiently short, any
marginal gain from actively monitoring the lender or collateral will
disappear, and the repo will turn into a blind-debt instrument. For
example, suppose that a hedge fund has a security with a current
market value of $1,000 and wants to borrow money in the repo
market. A repo seller owning a security valued at $1,000 can sell it to
the repo buyer for $900, agreeing to repurchase it at a later date for
$1,000. The $100 difference between the sale and repurchase price is
111. The "borrower" is known as the repo seller; the lender of buyer of the repo is in turn
entering into a "reverse repo." See Peter Hordahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo
Markets During the Financial Turmoil, BIS QUART. REV. 37, 38-39 (Dec. 2008) (describing
basic characteristics and uses of repo transactions).
112. Repos are structured as a sale of the security in order to protect the buyer from the
bankruptcy trustee of a seller. If the borrower goes into bankruptcy during the term of the
repo, the collateral does not become part of the bankruptcy estate because the lender already
owns it. This is different than if the transaction had been structured as a loan secured by the
security. See Section 559 of Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 559 (2005) (main section exempting
repo from automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (2010) (stay not applicable to exercise of
contractual rights by repo participant).
113. See Hordahl & King, supra note 111, at 37-38 (describing flight to safer, more liquid
collateral).
114. See The Bond Market Association, Supplemental Guidance Notes, The Master
Repurchase Agreement (1996 Version) and PSA/ISMA Global Master Repurchase Agreement
(1995 Version) 5-6 (June 1997), at http://www.sifma.net/agrees/master-repo-suppgn.pdf
(discussing various issues surrounding default in obligation to repurchase).
115. See Hordahl & King, supra note 47, at 40-41 (describing the risks associated with repo
defaults in the face of changing market conditions).
116. One of the reasons why shadow banks have a competitive advantage over traditional
banks is that banking regulations limits how much a bank can leverage itself. See Financial
Crisis Hearing, supra note 40, at 10-11 (statement of Andrew Lo) (discussing advantage of
hedge funds that are able to leverage selves much more than traditional banks).
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the haircut, equivalent to a cash margin but higher, because the
collateral may lose value before the repurchase date. On that date,
the parties can either settle the repo or roll it over.
One would expect that a repo lender who feels insecure will have
an incentive to make changes to reduce her risk exposure. She will
reduce the maturity and, if she still feels insecure, she will raise the
haircut on existing collateral and, if need be, require safer collateral,
such as Treasury bills. Finally, if after making these adjustments, the
lender still feels too exposed to credit risk, she will not renew the
repo. It follows that, as the short-term collateralized credit market
begins to feel insecure en masse, this same dynamic will eventually
turn repos into the equivalent of a demand deposit, with the
important exception that they will not be insured by the FDIC. In
other words, a demand deposit will roll over each day automatically,
but a depositor can refuse to renew the debt by withdrawing her
funds. Before FDIC insurance, this opened banks to bank runs.
Financial institutions using overnight repos equally depend on lenders
renewing their loans each day and can suffer the same types of runs.
C. RUNS REVISITED
Bank runs and runs on repos are both caused by informational
asymmetries among depositors and repo lenders, respectively, and
their knowing that each of their welfare is affected by what others
choose to do. This leads to the type of group dynamics problems
discussed supra Part II. I will develop the general arguments in
connection with runs on repos, but the same type of argument applies
to runs on banks. There are two general types of scenarios. Under
both, n parties are interconnected-their behavior can affect the
welfare of the others within the group. This interconnection is
created via their individual relationships with a financial institution.
Under one scenario, the parties all act simultaneously-in the sense
that at the time that they decide to act, they are unaware of what the
other parties are up to. For example, each depositor has two types of
actions available to it: to keep its money in the bank or withdraw it.
Each depositor will try to predict what others will do and will adopt
the same strategy. Because they cannot observe what others are up to
until it is too late, the depositors will need to err on the side of
caution, particularly if they at all believe that the others are in the
process of withdrawing their funds. Under a second type of scenario,
the informational asymmetry among the parties is different: a party
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will observe a second party doing something, such as withdrawing
funds from a bank. The observing party will have a piece of
information-a withdrawal has occurred-and must interpret that
action: it must determine the reason why the party has acted in the
way that it did. For example it may conclude that the other party is
withdrawing funds to pay her taxes or college tuition; alternatively, it
may conclude that the other party knows that the bank is in financial
distress. If the observer reaches the second conclusion, it too will
withdraw its funds. Now if a third party observers the first two
withdrawing funds it may conclude that the first two are worried
about the bank's financial health and withdraw its funds. And so on.
Both the first scenario-a coordination failure-and the second-
herding behavior-can lead to bank runs; they can also lead to runs
on repos. In the rest of this section I will further elaborate on these
two types of group dynamics, in the context of repos.
1. Coordination Failure Explanation of Run on Repos
In the normal course of business, repo lenders are in an
equilibrium position in which they believe that it makes sense to
renew the repo for one more day. A run will occur when those beliefs
change, and lenders converge to a new equilibrium, in which the best
strategy is not to roll over the repo. That is, repo lenders are involved
in a coordination game' with two equilibriums: Under one the
lenders have confidence that the borrower will repurchase the repos
(the "optimistic equilibrium"); under the other, they believe that the
borrower will default and they will all try to sell the collateral in a fire
117. One commonly used example of a coordination game involves two players choosing
whether to go to one of two events; they are unable to communicate ahead of time so to make
sure that they both choose the same event. If one chooses event A and the other chooses event
B, or vice versa, they are both worse off. On the other hand, if they both end up doing A or B
they each are better off. It may be that one player prefers A to B, but they both prefer to end
up in the same event as oppose to not spending the time together. Finally, since both player
choose their actions simultaneously-i.e., they cannot coordinate their behavior by
communicating or waiting to see what the other does-each will try to predict what the other
will do. As a result, there are two possible equilibriums to their coordination problem. Since
they each prefer both doing A or both doing B, but not any other alternative, and therefore
would not want to deviate from either equilibrium. Suppose that both players prefer the A-A
equilibrium over the B-B one. If they both end up doing B, their actions can be deemed to be a
coordination failure since their joint payoffs will be lower. For a formal discussion of the
coordination game, see DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 18-20 (1991)
(describing coordination game and showing that it has two Nash equilibriums); RUSSELL W.
COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES: COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MICROECONOMICS viii-Xiii
(1999) (discussing coordination failures in which the behavior of players leads to suboptimal
equilibrium).
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sale, making them all worse off (the "pessimistic equilibrium")."'
Under the coordination game, the lenders' decisions occur
simultaneously. When they each decide whether or not to rollover
their repos, they do not know what the other lenders have done.
Lenders may thus switch from the optimistic to the pessimistic
equilibrium if a sufficient number of them believe that others will not
renew their repos, since those who do will end up as creditors to an
insolvent financial institution or one without the liquidity to
repurchase the repos. Nonetheless, if the bank is in good financial
health, then the optimistic equilibrium is the preferred one. If
depositors' beliefs about what others will do have changed,'19 they will
all switch to the suboptimal equilibrium in which they trigger a bank
run and the healthy bank becomes insolvent.
The coordination explanation of repo runs captures one
dimension of the way in which the fates of repo lenders are
intertwined: A decision of one group of lenders to withdraw their
liquidity will harm those who agree to continue to provide the
borrower with funds for at least one more period. Another way of
saying this is that some of the costs and benefits flowing from a repo
lender's decision to stick to the status quo or to withdraw liquidity
will impact the welfare of other lenders. This payoff externality will
be present both in cases in which lenders act simultaneously and
those in which they move sequentially; however, when repo lenders
act sequentially, the earlier movers will also provide an informational
externality to later movers. 12 0 This informational externality can lead
to repo runs due to herding behavior.
118. This is the same setup as the bank run model developed by Diamond and Dybvig. See
Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 90, at 401 (classic treatment setting forth multiple equilibriums
model of bank runs, including role played by coordination failures and self-fulfilling beliefs).
119. Since the players have to decide what to do without having the benefit of waiting to see
what the others have done and without the ability to communicate, in order to achieve
coordination each player has to correctly predict what the others will do. In real world scenarios,
actors will try to use other information in order to predict what the others will do. To the extent
that they each has access to the same salient information or signal, it may act as a "focal point" that
will allow them to coordinate their actions. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLIC 54, 57 (1960) (stating that for players to achieve coordination they have to "read the
same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations
of each other can converge on. They must 'mutually recognize' some unique signal that
coordinates their expectations" and describing such a salient or prominent signal as a "focal
point").
120. See BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 2, at 147 (drawing distinction between payoff
externalities in which later movers receive higher payoffs by mimicking actions of earlier
movers, and informational externalities, in which the actions of these earlier movers provides
information to later movers).
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2. Repo Runs Due to Herding Behavior
Whenever, two actors are making the same type of decision and
one of them acts first, the second actor engages in "herding behavior"
if she mimics the first actor's behavior, notwithstanding the fact that if
she solely relied on her own private information, she would have
acted in a different manner. 121 In order to economize on information
costs, rational actors often choose to rely not just on their own private
information but also on the inferences that they draw from observing
the behavior of actors who are involved in making the same type of
decision. Since there is usually more than one possible rationale that
would explain the behavior of others, these "signals" are subject to
error costs due to the observer misinterpreting it. That
notwithstanding, this expected error cost may be lower than the cost
of acquiring the information directly.
To see how herding behavior can lead to a repo runs, assume
that there are three lenders. Lender 1 decides not to renew the repo
and upon observing this, Lender 2 does the same, believing that
Lender 1 acted on private information that either the borrower was in
financial trouble or the collateral was worth less than the face value of
the repos. Now Lender 3, upon observing the behavior of the first
two is even more likely to conclude that they refused to renew their
repos because they knew something. Notice that except for Lender 1,
the others made their decisions using only one piece of information:
the fact that they saw other Lenders pulling their liquidity.
However, there are a number of reasons why a lender may
decide not to rollover a repo: (1) it has private information that the
borrower is in financial stress or that the collateral is overvalued; (2)
the lender is facing its own financial difficulties; or (3) the lender is
aware that other financial institutions are in poor health. 12 2 Herding
behavior based on the first explanation is optimal if it leads to the
121. See A. V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herding Behavior, 107 0. J. ECON. 797, 798
(1992) (developing herding model in which actors merely mimic actions of others
notwithstanding fact that if relied on own information alone, it would lead to her to act
differently). In some extreme cases, the second actor mimics the first one without paying any
attention to her own private information and act in the same exact manner as the first actor. See
BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 2, at 148-49 (discussing this more extreme form of herding, usually
referred to as an informational cascade).
122. See BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 2, at 28 (drawing distinction between traders who sell
assets due to own private reasons and those who sell for common reasons, such as private
information that the assets are overvalued).
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failure of the poorly performing institution; however, herding based
on the other two explanations can lead to the inefficient failure of an
otherwise healthy institution. However, as a general matter, a later
moving lender will not know why the first lender decided not to
renew the repo, and it is this informational asymmetry that can lead
to inefficient herding.123
3. Conclusion
In both explanations of repo runs, even a slight doubt as to the
value of widely used collateral could cause lenders to exit the market
so as not to be caught in a fire sale with other holders of the same
collateral.124 The problem is even greater for collateral that has no
real market and no way of ascertaining its true value or other's
willingness to purchase it in the midst of a panic. Those holding this
sort of highly illiquid collateral depended on the financial institution
surviving one more day. But this in turn required that other repo
lenders believed the same thing and thus would agree to renew their
repos for one more day. For example, the Lehman bankruptcy report
shows in great detail that a large reason for Lehman's sudden collapse
was its reliance on the repo market and the refusal of some lenders to
continue to rollover repos, given the increasing uncertainty about the
value of the assets that Lehman had available for collateral. While in
theory, a run on a poorly performing institution may make society
better off by redistributing assets to more valuable projects,'2 given
the connection between financial institutions, a run on such an
institution can lead to suboptimal results from a system-wide
perspective.
123. See V. V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, Banking Panics, Information, and Rational
Expectations Equilibrium, 43 J. FIN. 749 (1988) (setting forth a bank run model in which a
sufficiently large set of individuals withdraw at the same time for private reasons not necessarily
related, and these withdrawers are observed by others that infer that those withdrawals are due
to liquidity problems in that bank).
124. See Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 25-26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14398, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4398 (describing
the collapse of repo market beginning in August 2007).
125. For example, a bank run may nonetheless be socially beneficial if it leads to the
dissolution of an insolvent bank that has no positive value as a going concern. See Itay
Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs, 60 J.
FIN. 1293, 1295 (2005) (contrasting efficient and inefficient bank runs).
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D. OTHER RISKS OF RELYING ON REPOS AND OTHER FORMS OF
SHORT-TERM DEBT
Firms that rely heavily on short-term financing open themselves
to a risk that creditors will refuse to continue to rollover the debt.
There are three principal reasons why this may happen. First, the
borrower has defaulted on an existing debt or some other information
has reached the market indicating that rolling over the debt in its
previous form would be too risky. The lender may refuse to roll over
the debt, raise the interest rate, demand additional collateral, or
impose more onerous covenants.126 Second, even though the
borrower is in sound financial health, the lender may no longer have
the ability to rollover the loan. This may be because the lender is a
financial institution that receives its funds from an investor who has
withdrawn its capital. For example, the lender may be a bank who no
longer has sufficient capital to lend because a sufficient number of
depositors have withdrawn their money and the bank cannot meet its
regulatory capital requirements.
Third, even though both the borrower and lender are in good
financial health, other lenders and borrowers may be experiencing
financial difficulty. There are two reasons why this may affect the
transaction between the otherwise financially healthy borrower and
lender. First, the lender may not know whether the financial
difficulties faced by other lenders is based on private information
about the market or economy that it is not privy too-i.e., the lender
may be in the same poor financial position, or not, but in any case is
uncertain about it. As a result, it may act prudently and delay making
additional loans until it can resolve this uncertainty. 127 The lender
may also be worried about a contagion or spillover effect. That is, if
other lenders and borrowers are experiencing difficulty, this can lead
to a reduction in lending opportunities, greater costs of raising capital
in debt and equity markets, or fewer risk-sharing opportunities with
126. Credit agreements are usually interconnected either expressly or implicitly in one
important way: The existence of one default can trigger other defaults in credit transactions
with other creditors. Many loan agreements contain cross-default provisions. Under such a
provision, the debtor is deemed to be in default not because it has breached a provision in the
agreement in question, but because they have breached another loan agreement.
127. This is an example, of what economists refer to as a real option: given the uncertainty, it
may make sense for the lender to delay making an irreversible decision, until it has acquired
information that resolves this uncertainty. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK,
INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6-7 (1994) (discussing the value of an option of delaying
making a decision that is costly to reverse when there is still uncertainty about how the future
will unfold).
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other financial institutions.
Even if the lender is not worried about its incomplete
information of what is ailing other lenders and borrowers or of
spillover effects, its decision to rollover an existing loan agreement
can be affected by a second type of informational problem: It does
not know whether the borrower is in fact a "good" one or one that is
also experiencing financial difficulties. When the number of known
"bad" borrowers increases, the lender will have to revise its
assessment of the probability that it too may be dealing with a bad
borrower who is able to dissimulate its true financial position. This
leads to a standard adverse selection or market for lemons problem.
The lender will now perceive a greater risk that it is dealing with a
bad borrower and will either not rollover the debt, increase the
interest rate, or protect itself more thoroughly through loan
covenants or collateral.
E. Strategic Delays in Making Disclosures
Given the general fragility of financial institutions, the disclosure
of bad news can have a greater effect on the continuing viability of
the institution than on business firms, which are more robust to the
revelation of material changes in the operations and results of the
company. Some business firms are closer to financial institutions, in
that they can unravel quickly and fail upon the disclosure of
unexpected bad news: One example is innovation intensive start-ups
whose principal assets are intangible and difficult to value, pledge,
and sell, such as intellectual property and the human capital of the
founders.' From a social welfare maximizing perspective, one would
want financial institutions and business firms to survive if they have a
positive going-concern value: If the net present value of the expected
future cash flows (discounted to take into account the risk-free
interest rate, and other sources of impatience, and the risk associated
with the actual gross returns) are positive.12 9
128. Because of this, standard venture capital contract contain provisions to protect venture
capitalists against the risk of a start-up's sudden failure. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms,
2002 Wis. L. REv. 45 (2002).
129. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986)
(explaining the role of bankruptcy law in helping protect firms with positive going-concern
value from a quick unraveling due to creditors racing to grab assets before others are able to do
so).
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1. Managers' Incentive to Delay Disclosing Bad News
There are five principal reasons why the manager of a financial
firm may delay disclosing to regulators and the market that the firm is
facing financial difficulties. First, disclosure can lead the manager to
suffer an immediate loss that she may be able to avoid if the firm's
prospects turn around. If the manager owns stock options, the
disclosure may lead to a drop in the stock price and thus the value of
her options. The second reason why a manager may choose to delay
making a disclosure is that the disclosure may affect her reputation as
an effective manager, which can in turn negatively affect her future
employment prospects. This second reason is usually referred to in
the economics literature as "based on career" concerns. Third,
disclosure may lead regulators to step up their monitoring activity or
to require the firm to increase its regulatory capital. The latter will
constrain the 'ability of the manager to undertake riskier transactions
of the sort that are more likely to allow the firm to get out of financial
trouble (it can also lead the firm's prospects to worsen by a much
greater amount). Fourth, because of the contractual interconnections
between financial institutions, a firm that is in financial trouble may
choose to delay making disclosures to the capital markets or to
regulators (if there is possibility that the disclosures will leak out or
that regulators may alert the other financial institutions). Fifth, to the
extent that the financial intermediary is being financed with short-
term debt, it will want to delay alerting creditors about the problems
since it would give them an incentive not to roll over the debt.
2. Incentive to Delay by Other Firm Participants
Some parties will have an incentive to collude with managers to
delay disclosures; these include shareholders, subordinated debt-
holders,13 0 long-term lenders, and employees. While each of these
parties would individually want to find out about the firm's financial
troubles, they would want to only as long as that disclosure remained
130. This incentive of subordinated debt-holders to collude with managers to delay having
other creditors, shareholders, and regulators find out about the firm's true financial state is
important because some commentators have proposed that banks should be forced to borrow
more from subordinated debt-holders. The general idea is that these debt-holders will have a
better incentive than depositors to monitor bank managers. See, e.g., George Pennacchi, A
Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working
Paper No. 10-04, 2010), available at http://business.illinois.edu/finance/papers/2010/pennacchi.
pdf (discussing role of subordinated debt as contingent capital).
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private information. But company disclosures under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 are public
goods: Even though the disclosures are for 'the primary use of
shareholders, other parties cannot be prevented from getting access
to disclosure documents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.13' Even if shareholders were the only ones who had
access to the company's disclosure, once they get that information
they will have an incentive to trade on it, which will lead to it being
indirectly disclosed to the rest of the world. 13 2  While in theory,
shareholders may be better off if they all agreed not to trade on the
information as long as there is a positive option value from delaying
the release of the information, they face a collective action or
prisoner's dilemma problem in which they will each be better off
individually defecting and acting on that information.133
Subordinated debt-holders are in a slightly better position as
long as the company can make private disclosures to them. However,
they face a similar collective action problem: They will each have an
incentive to unwind their positions, but doing so will send a signal to
the rest of the market that the debt-holders have private information
about the firm's financial state. To the extent that there is no active
market for the subordinated debt and the group is small enough,
subordinated debt-holders may be able to overcome the collective
action problem and agree to delay taking any action that will allow
other market participants infer their private information.'34
131. There are some exceptions in which the SEC allows a company to file documents that
remain secret from everybody, including shareholders. On confidential filings, see Security Act
of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.406 (2013) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 17 C.F.R. §
240.24b-2 (2013).
132. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 278-92 (1992) (discussing role of unintentional information leakage due to
market transactions).
133. For a discussion for why a similar dynamics increase the difficulty of institutional
investors in forming voting coalitions to discipline managers, see Manuel A. Utset, Disciplining
Managers: Shareholder Cooperation in the Shadow of Shareholder Competition, 44 EMORY L.J.
71, 101-14 (1995) (arguing that in order to form coalitions, institutional investors will need to
disclose private information that they can otherwise use to make an arbitrage profit at the
expense of other institutional investors; and that problem is exacerbated by the fact that
whenever an investor discloses private information, other investors will be unable to verify that
it is truthful and meant to help form coalition as opposed to making an arbitrage profit).
134. For a discussion of the role of small groups in overcoming collective action problems see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (setting forth the classical
treatment of the problem, and in emphasizing the role of group size in overcoming collective
action problems); Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight
Saving: A Study of Binary Choices With Externalities, in MICROMOTIVES AND
MICROBEHAVIORS 211, 217-18 (1978) (describing size of group required to overcome collective
action problem).
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Since employees in financial institutions often have
compensation packages that include stock options, to the extent that
they have shares that they are able to sell, they will face the same
collective action problem as other shareholders. Their behavior will
thus signal to the market that the firm is doing poorly. Employees
will send an even more salient signal if they begin to leave the firm en
masse. An employee who finds out that her employer is doing poorly
will have an incentive to find a new job before too many other
employees try to do the same thing and before the market finds out
about the problem. An outside employer who finds out that the
employee's firm is doing poorly will discount for the risk that the
employee is at least partially responsible for the firm's problems. All
thing being equal, the new employer will perceive a greater amount of
risk if the employee is a manager or has broad supervisory
responsibilities. But in financial institutions, the actions of even
relatively low-level employees can have a disproportionate effect of
the firm's finances."' Additionally, employees in financial institutions
often work in teams, an institutional feature that makes it more
difficult for outsiders to determine which team members are primarily
responsible for bad results.136
3. Collective Incentive of Financial Intermediaries to Delay
Disclosure of Problems
Because of the informational asymmetries between financial
institutions, and the risk of disclosing a problem before others,
financial institutions will have an incentive to delay as much as
possible letting the world know about their collective problem. If the
financial firm in trouble is sufficiently interconnected with another
financial firm, then the second firm will have an incentive to delay
disclosure of the financial troubles until it has had sufficient time to
unwind its position with the troubled firm. This is of particular
importance when the troubled firm is acting as a counter-party to a
derivatives contract, since the firm's failure would lead to a breach of
135. See, e.g., Mark N. Wexler, Financial Edgework and the Persistence of Rogue Traders,
115 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 1, 3-7 (2010) (providing overview of history of rogue trading).
136. For a discussion of the problems that arise in monitoring individual performance when
the individual is part of a team, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 778-83 (1972); see also
Roy Radner, Team Decision Problems, 33 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 857 (1962)
(analyzing how a team of decision-makers working within a firm, but with differing
responsibilities and information, reaches collective decisions).
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that contract. Moreover, to the extent that it is difficult for one
intermediary to know the extent to which a second intermediary is
interconnected with other intermediaries. Suppose that firm A is in
derivatives contracts with firms B and C and that firms B and C are in
a similar relationship with each other. If firm A knows that firm B is
in trouble and is unaware of B's connection with C, then if firm A
withdraws funds from firm B, firm B may be forced to withdraw funds
from firm C, something that may lead firm C to withdraw funds from
A. This sort of domino effect is a common way in which financial
contagion gets propagated among financial intermediaries.
As financial institutions and regulators begin to sense growing
problems within the industry, problem-free financial institutions will
have an incentive to curb their dealings with other institutions. First,
they may be unable to tell the whether they are transacting with an
institution in financial trouble. Second, the problem-free institutions
do not want to send negative signals to regulators and investors. In
other words, it is the problem institutions that will be the most eager
to continue to enter into risky transactions: If they do not work out,
they will not necessarily be much worse off than before; but if the
transactions pay off they may be able to get over their ongoing
problem. Therefore, since problem institutions are the ones who are
most likely to want to enter into transactions, the good firms will exit
the market so as not to be confused with the problem firms. As a
result, only problem firm will be left in the marketplace, and if they
continue to transact with each other, they will have a greater risk that
things will fall apart rather quickly. At the end of this whole cycle, a
financial crisis may emerge out of "nowhere" and "spread quickly,"
but that is not what happened at all. Such a financial crisis built up
over time, insidiously, and when it was finally revealed to the world, it
may appear to some to be like a brushfire that quickly got out of
control. But this insidious contagion is best analogize to the slow
build-up of plaque in a person's arteries: At some point in time, a
relatively small shock to the system can trigger a heart attack, but the
real problem was already in place and waiting to occur.
F. COORDINATION, GOVERNANCE, AND COMPLEXITY
The ability of actors to coordinate their behavior will depend on
the complexity of the environment in which their cooperative
activities take place. Coordination will become more difficult to the
extent that actors have incomplete information about each other and
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their environment."' The problem is further exacerbated if their
behavior is guided by complex legal rules and contracts. More
generally, the ability of parties to avoid coordination failures and
inefficient herding will depend, in part, on the complexity of the
problem: the number of parties involved and the manner and number
of channels through which they are interconnected with each other;
the various ways in which an the observed action of one party-such
as depositor's withdrawing funds from a bank or a repo lender's
asking for more collateral or refusing to rollover a repo.
In designing governance rules regulators and private parties have
to confront another complexity constraint: the complexity of
governance regimes themselves. One source of governance
complexity is that associated with introducing additional actors into a
system. For example, a regulator considering a legal rule to increase
the transparency of corporate disclosures will need to have a sense of
how managers and shareholders come to comprehend the complex
environment in which they are situated. More generally, if observer
A-a shareholder or manager-faces a complex environment, E, a
regulator will face a larger and potentially more complex
environment. This is because the complexity of that composite
environment is a function of (1) two non-trivially complex
components-observer A and environment E; (2) the manner in
which those components interact; and (3) the way that the regulator
interacts with the complexity posed by (1) and (2).
A second source of governance complexity is the number of
legal1 38 and contractual rules that are used in a transactional or
governance context; all other things being equal, governance
137. Potential coordination failure plays an important role in business firms generally. See
CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 6 (1958) (arguing that "the
survival of an organization depends upon the maintenance of an equilibrium of complex
character in a continuously fluctuating environment . . . which calls for readjustment of
processes internal to the organization") (citation omitted); SIMON, supra note 63, at 72 (stating
that "cooperation will usually be ineffective -will not reach its goal, whatever the intentions of
the participants-in the absence of coordination"); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33, 35-36 (1988)
(arguing that within the firm, market mechanisms are replaced by an "entrepreneur-
coordinator" who makes production decisions). See also Manuel A. Utset, Towards a
Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540 (1995) (arguing that an important role
of corporate governance is to reduce the costs associated with these coordination failures and
bargaining breakdowns).
138. For a discussion of the complexity of legal rules, see Louis Kaplow, A Model of the
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) ("Legal rules often are
complex in order to distinguish different types of behavior that may have different
consequences.").
448 Vol. 10:2
RATIONAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWNS
complexity will increase with the number of rules. The level of
complexity will also depend on the way that rules interact with each
other and the identity of the actor who is trying to make sense of a
governance rule. Contractual rules and legal regulations do not
always interact in a transparent manner, particularly if those
interactions occur in the shadow of markets, which may or may not be
fully efficient.3 9 Moreover, all other things being equal, a repeat
player in a particular type of transaction will face a lower complexity
constraint than would a consumer or inexperienced transacting party.
It follows that designing legal rules to protect consumers is difficult, in
part, due to this "complexity asymmetry" between the repeat players
being regulated and the consumers being protected.
V. CONCLUSION
Financial meltdowns can create great welfare losses for society.
The set of market meltdowns that occurred in 2007 and 2008 created
the greatest retrenchment in the economy since the Great
Depression. Financial meltdowns can occur due to the perfectly
rational behavior of financial actors. This Article argued that rational
actors will have an incentive to delegate financial intermediaries the
risks associated with informational asymmetries. And that
intermediaries themselves will often find it more economical to in
turn transfer those risks to other intermediaries. This chain of
"blind" transactions can become quite long, and can lead to
information losses within financial system. As a result, they can
increase the likelihood of financial meltdowns. In developing this
general argument, the Article first discussed the nature of
informational asymmetries and group pathologies common in
financial transactions and the role of intermediaries and market in
139. In a perfectly efficient market, the equilibrium market price at a particular point in time
will incorporate all relevant information; as a result, efficient markets help reduce complexity by
allowing parties to ignore additional sources of information. See Hayek, supra note 1;
HERBERT SIMON, ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
27 (1992) (arguing that markets allow atomistic economic actors to conserve information, and
thus "to behave rationally with relatively simple computations and on the basis of relatively
little information"; and concluding that markets "make it possible for people of bounded
rationality to make reasonable choices"). But when a market is not efficient, the level of
complexity increases, as does the potential for complexity-driven market failures. See, e.g.,
Randall Dodd, Subprime: Tentacles of a Crisis, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2007, at 15 (stating that
mortgage-back security misvaluations in the period leading to Great Recession of 2007 were
caused in part by the fact that the "price discovery process is not transparent, and there is no
surveillance in the market to identify where there are vulnerable positions").
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dealing with both. It then argued that the decision to acquire
information is an investment decision: An inter-temporal decision
that requires an initial outlay that as a general matter will not be
recoverable if the information is not pertinent or has become stale.
As a result, there is often an option value associated with the decision
to acquire information. That is, given the uncertainty surrounding the
information and the general irreversibility of the investment, a party
will decide to delay acquiring even valuable information to the extent
that is even more valuable to delay until some of the uncertainty
surrounding the value of the information has been resolved. All
other things being equal, the greater the costs associated with
acquiring and processing the information, the greater the value of
delaying purchasing it. This is important in financial transactions
given the inherent complexity of the parties and financial contracts
involved. The Article also analyzes group pathologies that can
increase the likelihood of financial meltdowns and the relationship
between these and the incentive of financial actors to delay disclosing
bad news.
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